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Below are screenshots from Dyn’s Internet Intelligence showing the propagation of this BGP hijack.
In addition, TIC announced BGP hijacks for 20 individual IPs associated with Apple’s i Tunes service.
Despite the fact that the Tehran K-root is intended to only be accessible within Iran, as we will see below, it is currently being accessed by one of the largest US telecommunications companies.
This was likely intended to stay within Iran, but like Pakistan’s BGP hijack of Youtube in 2008, it was inadvertently leaked out of the country, preventing internet users in many countries from being able to visit these sites.
In his coverage of this incident, Russell Brandom of The Verge wrote arguably the most memorable opening sentence in tech journalism this year ().
Despite the fact that this instance of K-root was intended to only be visible from within Iran, we observed that it had leaked to telecommunications companies in India. telecommunications firm Cogent (often featured on the annual Baker’s Dozen blog post about trends among the largest transit providers in the world) is accepting the BGP route of the Tehran instance of K-root — suggesting a non-trivial number of their root queries are currently being answered by Iran.
(Shortly afterward, K-root’s operator RIPE published a responding blog post to further describe the operation of the Tehran root server.) The Tehran K-root is being leaked again. Below is a traceroute measurement performed from Cogent’s looking glass utility showing a measurement to 126.96.36.199/24 (K-root) from Washington D. It is ultimately directed to Rostelecom (state telecom of Russia) in Moscow before traveling to Delta Telecom (85.1) in Baku, Azerbaijan and on to IPM in Iran.
Hence, in the diagram below the hijack is represented by both origins AS12880 and AS65050.